A Beast’s Best Friend: Interspecies Friendship in the Thought of C. S. Lewis by Woodruff Tait, Edwin
Inklings Forever: Published Colloquium Proceedings 1997-2016 
Volume 10 A Collection of Essays Presented at 
the Tenth Frances White Ewbank Colloquium on 
C.S. Lewis & Friends 
Article 59 
6-5-2016 
A Beast’s Best Friend: Interspecies Friendship in the Thought of C. 
S. Lewis 
Edwin Woodruff Tait 
Follow this and additional works at: https://pillars.taylor.edu/inklings_forever 
 Part of the English Language and Literature Commons, History Commons, Philosophy Commons, and 
the Religion Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Woodruff Tait, Edwin (2016) "A Beast’s Best Friend: Interspecies Friendship in the Thought of C. S. Lewis," 
Inklings Forever: Published Colloquium Proceedings 1997-2016: Vol. 10 , Article 59. 
Available at: https://pillars.taylor.edu/inklings_forever/vol10/iss1/59 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for the Study of C.S. Lewis & Friends at Pillars 
at Taylor University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Inklings Forever: Published Colloquium Proceedings 
1997-2016 by an authorized editor of Pillars at Taylor University. For more information, please contact 
pillars@taylor.edu. 
z 42  z
a beast’s best friend: 
Interspecies friendship 
in the Thought of C. s. lewis
by Edwin Woodruff Tait
Edwin Woodruff Tait is a parent, homesteader, and 
independent scholar living in Richmond, Kentucky. He 
received his Ph.D. in religion, specializing in sixteenth-
century church history, from Duke University in 2005, and is 
the author of numerous articles in Christian History, where he 
is a contributing editor.
On May 15, 1942, C. S. Lewis wrote to Sister Penelope, “I am 
establishing quite a friendship with one of the rabbits wh. we now keep 
along with the deer in Magdalen grove. It was done by the discovery 
that he relishes chestnut leaves which grow too high for his teeth. He 
doesn’t yet allow me any familiarities but he comes and eats from my 
hand. If my jaws were as strong in proportion to my size as his I’d be 
able to pluck down the pinnacles of the tower with my teeth. But oh! 
The great lollipop eyes and the twitching velvet nose! How does He 
come to create both this and the scorpion?”1 
On July 29, he reported that “the Rabbit and I have quarrelled. 
. . . [H]e has cut me dead several times lately. . . . [S]o fair and yet so 
fickle!”2 On December 10 he wrote to Arthur Greeves describing his 
relationship with the rabbit as “an acquaintance (almost a friendship)” 
and still lamenting that the rabbit wouldn’t look at him.3 But Lewis 
eventually found a new rabbit friend. On July 26, 1944, he wrote to 
Sarah Neylan that he was “getting to be quite friends with an old 
Rabbit who lives in the Wood at Magdalen,” whom he had tamed by 
picking leaves off the trees and feeding them to the rabbit (the same 
method he had used with the first rabbit), and whom he named “Baron 
Biscuit.”4 In December of 1944 he wrote to Laurence Harwood of the 
same rabbit, whom he had apparently discovered was actually female 
and was now calling “Baroness Bisket.”5
Of course these letters are whimsical, and perhaps I am taking 
them too seriously. But Lewis took friendship very seriously indeed. 
1  C. S. Lewis, Collected Letters 2:520-21.
2  Collected Letters 2:525.
3  Collected Letters 2:540.
4  Collected Letters 2:618-19.
5  Collected Letters 2:634.
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Ironically, given his willingness to speak of being friends with a rabbit, 
he complained to Bede Griffiths that he was worried about the “decay 
of friendship” due to “the endless presence of women everywhere” as 
a threat to friendship. Friendship—specifically male friendship—was 
central to Lewis’s life. Furthermore, the theme of human-animal or 
cross-species friendship in particular shows up throughout Lewis’s 
work, as this paper will show. Lewis appears to have been haunted 
throughout his life by the possibility of a friendship that unites beings 
who are fundamentally different.
Lewis’s reference to his acquaintance with the rabbit as “almost a 
friendship” in the letter to Arthur Greeves may reflect his awareness of 
the fact that friendship between humans and “irrational” animals was 
declared impossible by the Aristotelian tradition. Thomas Aquinas 
treats the question in Question 25 of Summa Theologiae II/II, on “the 
object of charity.”6 According to Aquinas, charity is fundamentally 
the act of loving one’s neighbor “so that he may be in God” (article 
1). Charity “has the nature of friendship” (article 2), which consists 
in willing good to another. The specific good that charity wills for 
another is union with God. Thus, when Aquinas comes to deal with 
the question of whether irrational creatures may be loved out of 
charity in article 3, only one of his three reasons for answering in 
the negative pertain to the specific nature of charity (willing eternal 
happiness to another, which Aquinas argues is impossible in the case 
of irrational creatures who are not capable of such happiness). The 
other two apply to friendship more broadly, and are based on separate 
passages in Aristotle.
Aquinas’ first reason why friendship between humans and 
“irrational” creatures is impossible is that friendship consists in willing 
good to another. However, an irrational creature cannot, strictly 
speaking, “possess good,” because it lacks free will. Only a being with 
intellect and will is capable of choosing a good for itself and thus being 
benefited or harmed. Aquinas cites Aristotle’s discussion of chance 
in Book 2 of the Physics. Aristotle argues there (chapter 6) that “an 
inanimate thing or a lower animal or a child cannot do anything by 
6  Lewis suggested in a 1958 letter that most elements in his thought that 
people took to be Thomistic were really Aristotelian, describing Aquinas as a 
“top form” boy in the same class as Lewis, where Lewis was a “bottom form 
boy” and Aristotle was the teacher. (Collected Letters 3:995). That being said, 
Aquinas is important for placing Aristotelian ideas in a Christian context, 
and is often identified by writers on animal rights as a major (negative) 
influence on Christian attitudes to animals. 
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chance, because it is incapable of deliberate intention; nor can ‘good 
fortune’ or ‘ill fortune’ be ascribed to them, except metaphorically.” 
Both in his commentary on this text and in the Summa, Aquinas 
explains that this is the case because a being without free will does not 
have “dominion over its own action” (dominium sui actus).7 
As Judith Barad points out, this view seems inconsistent with 
Aquinas’ recognition elsewhere that animals have inclinations and 
appetites and are not simply to be equated with plants or inanimate 
objects.8 Given that recognition, is it not more reasonable to conclude, 
on Aquinas’ own principles, that animals can experience “good and 
ill fortune” to some degree, albeit to a lesser degree than humans? 
This is one of a number of places where it seems to me that Aquinas’ 
reverence for Aristotle has a baleful effect on his thought. 
Aquinas’ second reason for denying the possibility of human/
animal friendship is based in a different passage from Aristotle, this 
one from Book 8 of the Nicomachean Ethics. There Aristotle defines 
friendship as “living together,” or, in Aquinas’ terms, a “sharing of life” 
(communicatio vitae).9 Humans and animals, according to Aquinas, 
cannot share life together in the way required for friendship. They 
do not have common goals (in part, again, because animals are not 
capable of deliberate intentionality according to Aquinas). Without 
sharing a rational nature, friendship is impossible.
Lewis’s account of his friendship with the rabbit follows exactly 
the lines sketched out by Barad, ascribing to the rabbit exactly the 
sort of intentionality that Aquinas would allow (a desire for food), 
but then extrapolating from that to allow for the use of language that 
Aquinas would no doubt find unacceptably anthropomorphic. The 
7  Comm. in Phys. 229, http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Physics2.htm#6, 
accessed 12 May 2016. Similarly, in ST II/II 25.3, Aquinas says that good 
and bad pertains to “solum creaturae rationalis, quae est domina utendi bono 
quod habet per liberum arbitrium” (http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/
sth3025.html, accessed 12 May 2016).
8     Judith Barad, “Aquinas’ Inconsistency on the Nature and the Treatment 
of Animals.” Barad is unfair to Aquinas, I think, in her treatment of his 
claim that we should not treat animals cruelly because it will make us cruel 
to people. While it’s true that Aquinas doesn’t recognize that animals 
have any intrinsic rights or that we have moral duties to them directly, his 
“virtue ethics” leads him to conclude that treating animals cruelly develops 
a “habitus” of cruelty. This is, I think, more significant ethically than Barad 
recognizes.
9    Nicomachaen Ethics, Book 8, chapter 5, http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/
nicomachaen.8.viii.html (accessed 12 May 2016).
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rabbit initially becomes friends with Lewis because he desires to eat 
leaves that are too high for him to reach. Lewis speculates that the 
rabbit later rejects his friendship because Lewis had inadvertently 
given him something to eat that “disagreed with him.”10 A desire for 
food is, after all, something humans share with other animals, even in 
the Aristotelian paradigm. A human may therefore seek to satisfy that 
desire by giving an animal good food, and thus establish precisely that 
“sharing of life” which Aquinas disallows. Of course I am probably 
making far too much of this episode, but the frequency with which 
Lewis refers to the rabbit(s) during the mid-1940s indicates, I think, 
that it was of some importance to him.
Another incident, this one narrated by George Sayer, confirms 
Lewis’s interest in the capacity of non-human animals for friendship 
and affection. Sayer describes walking with Lewis late in the latter’s 
life and seeing a young pig give food to an older pig. According to 
Sayer, Lewis responded excitedly to this incident, declaring the young 
pig to be a “pog” and the harbinger of a new stage in porcine evolution, 
and asking for its blessing.11 Like the rabbit friendships, this incident 
is obviously playful and humorous, but it is further evidence of Lewis’s 
interest in the possibility of animal behavior that transcended the 
limits set by Aristotle.
The most systematic discussion of the capacity of non-human 
animals for friendship in Lewis’s work occurs in That Hideous Strength. 
Ivy Maggs, who functions in the novel as a voice of folk wisdom in 
contrast to the educated folly of characters such as Jane and MacPhee, 
refers to Mr. Bultitude the bear and Pinch the cat as “friends.” 
MacPhee insists that they can’t really be friends, and suggests various 
physiological explanations for their behavior, including the possibility 
of unconscious sexual attraction. Ivy responds defensively as if MacPhee 
were accusing the animals of moral indecency.12 Ransom intervenes to 
say that MacPhee is ascribing to the animals a distinction that simply 
does not exist for them. What we call “friendship” among humans is 
for us more articulately distinguished from physical comfort, sexual 
attraction, etc., than it is for other animals, but that doesn’t mean that 
something analogous to friendship does not exist among animals.13 
Lewis further illustrates this theory of animal psychology by narrating 
a later section of the book from the point of view of Mr. Bultitude, 
10   Collected Letters 2:540.
11   George Sayer, Jack: A Life of C. S. Lewis, 335.
12   C. S. Lewis, That Hideous Strength, 261.
13   C. S. Lewis, That Hideous Strength, 261-62.
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or more precisely from the point of view of the omniscient narrator 
trying to explain how Mr. Bultitude experienced the events.14
The events in question include important parts of the novel’s 
climax, in which Merlin, assisted by Mr. Bultitude and inhabited by 
the eldila, brings heavenly vengeance to the demonic N.I.C.E. And 
it is no coincidence that one of the N.I.C.E.’s principal activities is 
experimenting on animals. Mark Studdock betrays the inadequacy of 
his modern, sociological education as a form of moral formation by the 
fact that he has no moral revulsion to the awareness that the N.I.C.E. 
maintains a vast zoo of animals for purposes of experimentation, 
and no empathy with the animals.15 They simply represent, for him, 
evidence of the scale of the N.I.C.E.’s enterprise. This is an example of 
the way in which one’s reaction to vivisection functions, for Lewis, as 
a moral test. Not to be disturbed by animal suffering—to have a purely 
“instrumental” view of animals—is evidence of a lack of participation 
in what Lewis elsewhere calls the “Tao.”16
The proper understanding of our relationship with non-human 
animals is found at the end of That Hideous Strength in the epithalamium 
of the beasts, in which all the animals (including the human ones) pair 
up under the benign influence of Perelandra: “she comes more near 
the earth than she was wont—to make Earth sane.”17 This sanity not 
only leads to amorous coupling, but to a restoration of the natural state 
of humanity: “We are now as we ought to be, between the angels who 
are our elder brothers and the beasts who are our jesters, servants, and 
playfellows.”18
This understanding of the human relationship with animals 
is found at more length in Perelandra, where the unfallen “Lady” 
commands the creatures of Venus and they obey her willingly. They 
are, as in Ransom’s statement quoted above, her “servants.” There 
is clearly a hierarchical relationship. But it is also characterized by 
joyful companionship. Both Ransom and the “Un-man” benefit from 
the willingness of Perelandra’s animals to serve human beings. The 
Un-man, of course, abuses that willingness, commandeering a fish in 
order to escape Ransom with no thought for the fish’s welfare.19 
14  That Hideous Strength, 306-08, 350.
15  That Hideous Strength, 102.
16  C. S. Lewis, Abolition of Man, 70, 
17  That Hideous Strength, 378.
18  That Hideous Strength, 378.
19  C. S. Lewis, Perelandra, 158.
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He (it?) also casually tortures frogs, and Ransom’s final 
confrontation with the Un-man begins when Ransom attempts 
to stop the torture of a bird.20 One of the most disturbing signs of 
the Lady’s slow “corruption” by the Un-man’s temptations is her 
willingness to let him dress her in a cloak of feathers to make her more 
beautiful, and her casual disinterest in the question of just how the 
Un-man got the feathers.21 Animals are servants and in some sense 
instruments in Perelandra, but they are not mere instruments, and the 
slightest movement toward treating them as such is a matter of grave 
significance.
One of the Un-man’s most telling arguments against Ransom 
in their extensive debate over the fate of the Lady and her planet is 
that Ransom’s discomfort with the prospect of humans replacing 
non-human sentient beings as the focus of “Maleldil’s” purposes in 
the universe mark Ransom out as “what we call ‘Bad,’” which the 
Un-man defines as someone who turns away from the coming good 
out of preference for past good.22 The “Unman ethic,” which led the 
human Weston to surrender himself to demonic forces and become 
the “Unman” and is identified by Lewis with Bergson’s “creative 
evolution,” is a worship of “becoming” for its own sake.23 
Weston tells Ransom that this ethic transcends conventional 
notions of good and evil because what is conventionally called evil is 
actually the driving force pushing into the future, while “good” is the 
ideal that beckons from the future. Weston admits to Ransom that 
his earlier views, evident in Out of the Silent Planet, were irrationally 
anthropocentrism. All that matters is “Life,” whatever form Life 
may take. 24 Reading this text for the first time, I took this to be a 
sign of conversion and spiritual growth in Weston. Weston’s violent, 
colonialist anthropocentrism is condemned throughout Out of the 
Silent Planet. Surely his willingness to recognize “Life” in non-human 
forms is an improvement? 
But of course it is this “conversion” to Life-force worship that 
leads to “Weston’s” horrific transformation from a misguided, 
perhaps evil human being to a demon wearing a human body, with 
the fragmented psyche of the original “Weston” still gibbering away 
somewhere in the depths and occasionally surfacing when the “Un-
20  Perelandra, 152.
21  Perelandra, 134-138.
22  Perelandra, 114.
23  Perelandra, 90-96, 121.
24  Perelandra, 91.
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man” allows it to for pragmatic purposes.25 The primary characteristic 
of the demonic form of “creative evolution” represented by the Un-man 
is its total pragmatism, its instrumentalizing of absolutely everything, 
even (as Ransom observes at one point) rationality itself. In Out of 
the Silent Planet, Oyarsa had identified Weston’s loyalty to his own 
species as a genuine virtue, although a minor one.26 Weston’s loss of 
this virtue represents not a step forward on the moral and spiritual 
scale but his final loss of the “good of intellect” and his descent into 
demonic madness.
Thus, the Un-man’s argument to the Lady about Ransom’s 
“badness” is complex and ironic. He is evoking the orthodox 
anthropocentrism which the Lady assumes, in order to seduce her to 
his own worship of pointless destruction in the name of change and 
evolution. Ransom’s sorrow that there will be no more sentient “beasts” 
but only anthromoporphic beings now that the Incarnation has taken 
place is, in the context of the Space Trilogy, a response to his experiences 
in the first book and his choice to identify with the nonhuman 
Malacandrians over Weston’s murderous anthropocentrism. 
The unfallen Lady cannot understand this impulse. She knows 
only a healthy hierarchical relationship with animals who are not hnau 
(rational), the kind of relationship sketched by Ransom at the end of 
the third book.27 (Indeed, Ransom’s own journey to spiritual maturity 
in the course of Perelandra consists in part of his coming to see the 
beauty and fittingness of this kind of anthropocentrism.) The Lady is 
thus ironically in danger of accepting Weston’s demonic ideology in 
contrast to Ransom’s flawed but basically virtuous sympathy for the 
“older” forms of rational creation represented by the Malacandrians. 
Yet Ransom’s point of view is not all wrong, as indicated by the “Great 
Dance” at the end of Perelandra, which affirms that everything in the 
universe is in its own way a “center” and that the Malacandrians are 
not just disposable precursors to the real show.28
Moving backwards within the Trilogy, we come finally to Out 
of the Silent Planet, where we find (for the first time in Lewis’s work if 
we don’t count the Boxen material) a fictional depiction of a society 
of non-human rational beings (hnau). As Ransom journeys through 
the Malacandrian landscape, he journeys spiritually from an initial 
abject fear of non-human life (filtered through the deeply depraved 
25  Perelandra, 96.
26  Out of the Silent Planet, 137-138.
27  That Hideous Strength, 378.
28  Perelandra, 214-219.
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imaginations of Weston and Devine), to a gradual understanding and 
acceptance of the great diversity under which rationality manifests 
itself. 
Ransom’s friendship with the hross Hyoi is the catalyst for his 
coming to a sober understanding of his species’ place in the universe—
which will, ironically, make him reluctant to accept the revelation of 
just how important humans are in the cosmic scheme in Perelandra). 
When he first meets Hyoi, he interprets him as an “animal,” just as 
he sees the seroni as monsters.29 Ironically, Hyoi’s animality helps 
Ransom deal with the shock of dealing with a sentient alien lifeform. 
When he thinks of Hyoi as a man, he finds him monstrous, but when 
he thinks of him as an animal, he finds him a kind of “animal 2.0,” 
with everything one might wish in a pet plus the ability to function as 
an intellectual equal.30 
Weston and Devine’s killing of Hyoi induces in Ransom a deep 
guilt for being human, an awareness of just how murderous and fallen 
his species is. The narrative has prepared us for the possibility that 
Hyoi will be killed by the monstrous hnakra, but in fact he successfully 
kills the hnakra only to be killed by the humans, driving home Lewis’s 
point about just who the real monsters are in the story.31 
The multispecies rationality of Malacandra is not essential 
to its “unfallenness,” but Lewis clearly suggests, through Ransom’s 
complete lack of comprehension of the possibility of the three species 
living in harmony, that it is only possible on an unfallen world and 
is thus one of the signs of the planet’s innocence. One of the sorns 
remarks at one point that the people of “Thulcandra” (our planet) must 
be “at the mercy of their blood” because we cannot compare thought 
with thought that “floats on a different blood.” Toward the end of 
the book Ransom stays in a guesthouse with all three Malacandrian 
species, and realizes that Malacandrian humor arises largely from the 
interactions of hnau who have different biologies.32 In a purported 
letter from Ransom to Lewis appended to the book, he claims that 
while we can have friendship with other humans and affectionate 
relationships with animal pets, on Malacandra the two experiences 
may be combined in a single relationship. Hence, the Malacandrians 
do not need pets.33 
29  Out of the Silent Planet, 55, 45.
30  Out of the Silent Planet, 58.
31  Out of the Silent Planet, 125.
32  Out of the Silent Planet, 117.
33  Out of the Silent Planet, 156.
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Four years after writing this, Lewis was telling various 
correspondents about his friendship with the rabbit in the Magdalen 
garden. It is probably not a coincidence that the years during which 
he writes about these “rabbit friendships” are also years when he was 
working on the Space Trilogy, developing his first major fictional 
universe that explored the possibility of multiple rational species and 
the disastrous consequences of a purely instrumental approach to life. 
Lewis’s fullest exploration of a world filled with multiple 
intelligent species was, of course, his Chronicles of Narnia. When Lucy 
Pevensie steps out of the wardrobe into that snowy wood, she steps into 
a world where our normal assumptions about the place of humanity 
appear to be upended. Mr. Tumnus is astonished to meet a human, 
and his library contains books suggesting that humans are mythical 
creatures.34 The White Witch attempts at first to put Edmund in 
Narnian categories, suggesting that he must be an overgrown dwarf 
who has cut off his beard.35 The Beavers tell the Pevensies that “there’s 
never been any of your race here before.”36 While the White Witch 
looks human, the Beavers assure the children that she isn’t really 
human at all.37 
Yet it turns out that humans are not as alien to Narnia as first 
appears. There are those four thrones in Cair Paravel destined to be 
filled by “sons of Adam and daughters of Eve.”38 While humans in 
this first Narnia book appear to be a novel introduction into Narnia, 
they are not unheard-of and a place has been prepared for them 
by prophecy, as rulers of the land under Aslan. At the same time, 
a “pseudo-human” ruler oppresses the various creatures of Narnia, 
favoring some (wolves, dwarfs, and various kinds of monsters) over 
others and mimicking with her tyranny of dark magic the properly 
hierarchical rule Aslan intends for Narnia. The White Witch’s regime 
is in fact a reversal of the attitudes of the N.I.C.E., although it is 
similar in its use of dark magic and its ultimate reduction of rights and 
dignity to one all-powerful figure.
In the sequel, Prince Caspian, Lewis returns to themes familiar 
from the Space Trilogy. A tyranny of humans has now slaughtered the 
sentient non-humans or driven them into exile, and has put in place a 
34  C. S. Lewis, The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, 115 (all Narnia 
citations are to the omnibus edition from HarperCollins).
35  The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, 124.
36  The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, 147.
37  The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, 147.
38  The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, 148.
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stodgy, boring, materialistic society that denies magic and mystery and 
suppresses freedom. At the same time, in this book the importance of 
human rule is emphasized far more than in The Lion, the Witch, and the 
Wardrobe. Trufflehunter insists that things were never right in Narnia 
except when a Son of Adam was king. It isn’t a country for men, but 
it’s a country for a man to be king of.39
Finally, in the penultimate book to be published, Magician’s 
Nephew, Lewis provides his most systematic account of the Narnian 
universe. Aslan creates all kinds of creatures and then chooses to 
breathe sentient life into certain of them, giving the talking animals 
authority over the non-sentient creatures while exhorting them to treat 
them gently.40 He also (proving the Beavers wrong) makes a human 
couple rulers of Narnia, exhorting them to treat all their subjects with 
fairness and equality.41 Uncle Andrew’s stubborn insistence on closing 
himself off from the voice of Aslan makes him unable to hear and 
understand the voices of his non-human fellow creatures, and makes 
him similarly opaque to them. But while he regards them as mere 
“brutes” to be feared or used or destroyed, they show their virtuous 
character by attempting to treat him kindly according to his nature, 
even if their efforts are not very successful. By the end of the book 
they have come to see him as a pet—an exception to the rule that in 
Narnia, as in Malacandra, there don’t seem to be pets.42
Thus, in Narnia Lewis depicts a hierarchical society but one 
where freedom and equality of dignity are highly valued. Friendship 
among different kinds of creatures is not only possible but highly 
valued. It is Lucy’s friendship with Tumnus that gives him the courage 
to defy the Witch, and the children a motive for staying in Narnia in 
spite of the dangers. In Prince Caspian, Dr. Cornelius, stranded in 
a world of hostile humans, tells Caspian “what friend have I in the 
wide world save Your Majesty?”43 In the same book, Trumpkin earns 
the nickname “the dear little friend” from the children. Reepicheep’s 
friendship with Lucy, in particular, is an important theme in Voyage 
of the Dawn Treader. In The Silver Chair, the three Narnians respond 
to the realization that they’ve been eating Talking Stag in varied ways 
that correspond to their immersion in Narnian multispecies society: 
Jill merely feels sorry for the stag, Eustace is horrified because he has 
39  C. S. Lewis, Prince Caspian, 347.
40  C. S. Lewis, The Magician’s Nephew, 69-71.
41  The Magician’s Nephew, 81.
42  The Magician’s Nephew, 71-79, 97-98.
43  Prince Caspian, 343.
INKLINGS FOREVER X
z 52  z
actually had a talking animal as a friend, while Puddleglum feels as if 
he had eaten a baby.44 
But the Narnian book where interspecies friendship plays the 
most important role is arguably The Horse and His Boy. Lewis may 
be influenced by medieval romances such as Bevis of Hampton in 
which horses speak to their riders and indeed play an important role in 
training their riders in chivalry.45 Bree becomes a tutor to Shasta not 
only in riding but in courtesy and “free” behavior. At the same time, 
it turns out that Bree himself has a lot to learn. Friendship between 
Shasta and Aravis, divided by social class, turns out to be even more 
difficult than friendship between Shasta and Bree. In the end, the four 
fugitives, two human and two equine, are brought together by their 
shared journey from slavery to freedom, in which the strengths of both 
species, both sexes, and a diversity of social experiences all contribute 
to make their quest for freedom successful. The key moment in Aravis’ 
development from an arrogant (though honorable) Calormene lady to 
the future Queen of Archenland is her decision to go across the desert 
with a lower-class boy and two horses rather than stay in Calormen 
with Lasaraleen.46
In the Chronicles, Lewis explores playfully the theme first 
suggested in Out of the Silent Planet, that a world with multiple 
intelligent species would have a capacity for rich and varied friendships 
that surpasses our own and combines the emotional satisfaction we get 
from friendship and the kind we get from pets. He explores Perelandra’s 
suggestion that there might be different ways of configuring the 
“center,” asking how God might be manifest in a world of talking 
animals. And yet Narnia is in a sense more robustly anthropocentric 
than the world of the Trilogy. There humans are central because 
Maleldil has become human. Narnia is supposedly an entirely other 
world, with a parallel “incarnation” of the Logos as a lion. 
Yet it is also a world where “Sons of Adam” are supposed to reign. 
Lewis never explains why. Does the significance of the Incarnation 
radiate outward even to worlds reachable only by magic? Is Narnia, 
after all, a kind of shadow world to our own? Or did he just not think it 
through? Nonetheless, the Narnia books underline Lewis’s fascination 
with the possibility of friendship with the “other” and his hatred of all 
forms of tyranny of one kind of creature over another, and all forms 
44  C. S. Lewis, The Silver Chair, 608.
45  See Bonnie J. Erwin, “Beyond Mastery: Interspecies Apprenticeship in 
Middle English Romance.”
46  C. S. Lewis, The Horse and His Boy, 253. 
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of cruelty to animals—or to anyone. The hierarchy of Narnia, like the 
hierarchy of the Trilogy, is fundamentally non-coercive. All beings act 
according to their natures, and thus a spontaneous order emerges in 
which difference does not involve dominance or competition.
One interspecies friendship in Narnia, however, towers above 
the rest—that between Aslan and the human children.47 Of course, 
Aslan is a special case, because at the end of The Last Battle “he no 
longer looked to them like a lion,” and he is clearly intended to be a 
“parallel incarnation” of Christ in some sense.48 (Whether this implies 
a kind of Docetistic Christology, as one Catholic critic has claimed, is 
a separate issue).49 
But by making the children experience the divine as an animal, 
Lewis provides us with his most daring example of interspecies 
friendship. Aslan really is “the wholly other,” and yet he embodies an 
archetype that has powerful resonance in our world as well. Lewis had 
always been fond of human-animal relationships as a symbol of our 
relationship with God, particularly using dogs in this way. In Narnia, 
he reverses the imagery—the humans have a relationship with an 
animal who is also a manifestation of the divine. The characters who 
see Aslan as merely a “wild beast” are characters who at best (like 
Trumpkin) need some serious spiritual growth, or at worst (like Uncle 
Andrew) are stubbornly closed off from the divine, and indeed from 
recognizing the dignity of their fellow creatures no matter the species.
Lewis’s imaginative explorations of human interactions with 
non-human species, as well as his frequent discussions of the subject in 
letters and nonfictional works, suggest that he was both working within 
and implicitly challenging the Aristotelian/Thomist framework. He 
clearly accepted the premise that friendship involves the ability to 
share goals and a way of life, and he imagined ways in which humans 
and other animals might do so. He accepted the premise that willing 
the good of another implies that the other has agency, and again, he 
repeatedly ascribes agency to “irrational” animals. Furthermore, he 
developed fictional universes in which non-human “rational” beings 
existed. 
These universes are still (in a qualified sense) anthropocentric, 
and (in a less qualified sense) hierarchical. But it is also an imaginative 
celebration of diversity and multiculturalism that (one would think) 
47  I am indebted to Padmini Sukumaran for pointing this out in 
conversation.
48  C. S. Lewis, The Last Battle, 767.
49  Eric Seddon, “Letters to Malcom and the Trouble With Narnia.” 
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ought to shatter the preconceptions of people who see Lewis as simply 
a defender of traditional British mores and the privileges of straight 
white males. In the words of Perelandra: “Thus each is equally at the 
center and none are there by being equals, but some by giving place and 
some by receiving it, the small things by their smallness and the great 
by their greatness, and all the patterns linked and looped together by 
the unions of a kneeling with a sceptred love. . . . We also have need 
beyond measure of all that He has made. Love me, my brothers, for 
I am infinitely necessary to you and for your delight I was made. . . . 
Love me, my brothers, for I am infinitely superfluous, and your love 
shall be like His, born neither of your need nor of my deserving, but a 
plain bounty. Blessed be He!”50
50  Perelandra, 217.
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